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THE APPEARANCE OF ELECTION LAW
John CopelandNagle*
The Supreme Court decided 402 election law cases during the twentieth century.
That statistic, and lots of other helpful information, is gleaned from the excellent
summary of election law written by Rick Hasen.I Professor Hasen is the nation's most
prolific election law scholar: co-author of an election law casebook, 2 host of the leading
election law web site, 3 and author of numerous law review articles discussing various
aspects of election law. 4 The Supreme Court and Election Law represents Professor
Hasen's attempt to distill nearly four decades of Supreme Court decisions and academic
scholarship regarding election law and to articulate a theory of how and when the Court
should apply the Constitution to election law disputes. The book, like all of Professor
Hasen's work, is exhaustively researched, clearly written, and animated by a powerful
normative view of the proper operation of election law.
But is there such a thing as "election law"? That term was relatively uncommon
until the presidential election of 2000, with general considerations of legislation or "the
law of democracy" favored in law schools and few attorneys engaged in the practice of
"election law." Now, thanks in no small part to Professor Hasen, we describe questions
of reapportionment, voting rights, campaign finance, and the counting of votes as
belonging to the same category of election law. That category could also include the
standards for determining whether to order a new election or instead to prescribe some
other relief for a contested election, the role of Congress as the judge of the elections of
its members, the use of popular initiatives to enact laws governing the electoral process,
and the appropriate structure for the rules of how, where, and when to vote. Professor
Hasen's book addresses "an important subset" of election law cases, "those that regulate
political equality." 5 The litigation concerning these issues raises several distinct kinds
of issues, including the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause, the scope of the First Amendment's protection of the freedom of speech,
federalism, separation of powers, and statutory interpretation generally. Even within
that subset, though, the search for a unifying principle continues to confound judges and
* Professor, Notre Dame Law School; nagle.8@nd.edu. I am grateful for the opportunity to present this
paper at a symposium addressing Professor Hasen's book held at the Notre Dame Law School on April 23,
2004.
1. RICHARD HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW (2003). Appendix 1 contains a list of
all 402 Twentieth Century Supreme Court election cases. See id. at 166-75.
2. RICHARD HASEN & DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, ELECTION LAW - CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed.
2004).
3. http://www.electionlawblog.org.
4. See, e.g. Comments on Baker, Clark, and Direct Democracy, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 563
(2004); The Constitutionalityof a Soft Money Ban after Colorado Republican II, I ELECTION L.J. 195 (2002);
Do the Partiesor the People Own the ElectoralProcess?, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 815 (2001); Vote Buying, 88
CAL. L. REv. 1323 (2000).
5. HASEN, supra note 1, at 2.
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scholars alike. Indeed, that is a key part of the message of Professor Hasen's work.
My purpose here is to suggest another explanation. The Supreme Court's
reapportionment, voting rights, campaign finance, and vote counting cases share an
unusual affinity for reliance upon appearances as an operative legal standard. The
commonplace maxim that appearances are in the eye of the beholder only begins to
suggest how troubling this pattern could be. My suggestion, briefly described in this
essay, is to encourage the project of identifying what is at issue in these cases so that we
can learn what "election law" is really all about.

Professor Hasen argues against the process theory that has become so popular in
election law scholarship and "advocates a substantive theory of political equality" in its
place. 6 He first identifies three reasons why process theory has been problematic: it has
failed to limit judicial power, it "masquerades as purely procedural rather than a
substantive basis for review of political cases," and it does not say how courts should
intervene in election issues. 7 The alternative favored by Professor Hasen is to rely upon
the substance of equality rather than the process. He "argues in favor of preserving
room for Court intervention in the political process, but for intervention that is (1)
tentative and malleable, (2) focused on individual (or sometimes group) rights and not
the 'structure' or 'functioning' of the political system, (3) protective of core political
equality principles, and (4) deferential to political branches' attempts to promote
contested visions of political equality." 8 The distinction between "core" and
"contested" political equality rights is key to this theory of how the Supreme Court
should address election cases. Bright-line rules should protect core rights; more flexible
standards should govern contested rights. Thus, Professor Hasen writes, "If we may
meaningfully distinguish between core rights that the Court should protect and
contested rights that the Court should not constitutionalize, the Court's political equality
9
jurisprudence would markedly improve."
But that is a big "if." Which rights are "core" and which are "contested"?
According to Professor Hasen, core rights are the "small universe" of "few basic"
political equality rights "that hardly would be controversial" and that "are absolutely
essential for any government to function as a democracy," as indicated by constitutional
text or history or by basic political theory.
Many of the core rights, moreover, are
socially constructed, so that it is necessary to identify a social consensus that recognizes
them.' 1 Or, more accurately, it is "really 'social near-consensus"' that determines
whether a core political equality right exists, for a complete consensus would be
2
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve in favor of any right.1
Professor Hasen seeks to start "a dialogue about which political equality principles
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See id. at 7.
See id. at 4-6.
Id. at 10.
Id.at 78.
Id. at 79.

11. HASEN, supranote 1, at 80.

12. Id.
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belong in the core." 13 He identifies three: an essential rights principle, 14 an
antiplutocracy principle, 15 and a collective action principle. 16 Stated abstractly, each
principle is unobjectionable, but the consensus begins to collapse with the details.
Consider the choice between public and private funding of campaigns.
The
antiplutocracy principle states that "[t]he government may not condition the ability to
participate fundamentally in the electoral process on wealth or the payment of
money."' 17 That principle condemns poll taxes, and as Professor Hasen notes, "some
scholars have argued that the antiplutocracy principle requires that government publicly
finance candidate election expenses."' 18 Professor Hasen is a champion of public
campaign financing, too, and he speculates that such funding could become a core
political equality right "if enough states enact laws providing for public financing of
20
state campaigns.' 19 Yet Professor Hasen admits that consensus does not yet exist.
Conversely, Professor Hasen agrees that "there is no consensus (or near-consensus) that
private financing of political campaigns is constitutionallyobjectionable."' 2 1 In fact, the
precise opposite might be true. The essential rights principle-the first of the three that
Professor Hasen lists-posits that "[e]ach person has basic formal political rights,
including the right to speak on political issues, to organize for political action, and to
petition the government."' 22 That is precisely the right that opponents of campaign
contribution and spending limits insist is violated by many campaign finance
regulations. The problem, of course, is that the private campaign activities that appear
to some to be a vindication of the essential rights principle appear to others to violate
the anti-plutocracy principle.
II.
That is only the beginning of the conflicting appearances that characterize election
law. The Court's election law jurisprudence is preoccupied with appearances. First,
Buckley v. Valeo held that the "appearance" of corruption provides a sufficient
justification-indeed, a "compelling state interest"-for campaign finance regulations
that implicate the freedom of speech protected by the first amendment. 23 The Court's
per curiam opinion posited that "the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming
from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large
individual financial contributions" was "[o]f almost equal concern as the danger of
actual quid pro quo arrangements." '24 The Court relied upon that concern to uphold the

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 81.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 86.
See HASEN, supra note 1, at 88.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 87.
Id. at 103.
See HASEN, supra note 1, at 87 ("Claims that the Constitution should require full public financing of

electoral campaigns ... go too far.").

21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 87.
Id. at 82.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Id. at 27.
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contribution limits and disclosure provisions contained in the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA). 25 Since Buckley, the appearance of corruption rationale has
saved numerous campaign regulations. 26 Most recently, in upholding the Bipartisan
27th
Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, the
Court repeated that the prevention of the appearance of corruption operates as "a
sufficiently important interest to justify political contribution limits."' 28 As Justices
Stevens and O'Connor explained, "Take away Congress' authority to regulate the
appearance of undue influence and 'the cynical assumption that large donors call the
tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic
governance."' 29 The Court thus invoked the concern about the appearance of
corruption in upholding the disparate campaign regulations contained in BCRA. Justice
Kennedy, by contrast, objected that:
The majority attempts to mask its extension of Buckley under claims that BCRA
prevents the appearance of corruption, even if it does not prevent actual corruption,
since some assert that any donation of money to a political party is suspect. Under
Buckley's holding that Congress has a valid "interest in stemming the reality or
appearance of corruption," however, inquiry does not turn on whether some persons
assert that an appearance of corruption exists. Rather, the inquiry turns on whether
the Legislature has established that the regulated conduct has inherent corruption
potential, thus justifying the inference that regulating the conduct will stem the
appearance of real corruption ....
[T]he Court today should not ask, as it does,
whether some persons, even Members of Congress, conclusorily assert that the
regulated conduct appears corrupt to them. Following Buckley, it should instead
inquire whether the conduct now prohibited inherently poses a real or substantive
quid pro quo danger, so that its regulation will stem the appearance of quid pro quo
30
corruption.
Professor Hasen says little about the appearance of corruption rationale in his
book or in his subsequent article examining McConnell v. FEC.3 1 Instead, he focuses

25. See id. at 26 (the appearance of corruption justifies contribution limits); id. at 28 (Congress could
conclude that contribution limits are necessary to address the "appearance of corruption inherent in a system
permitting unlimited financial contributions"); id. at 67 ("disclosure requirements.., avoid the appearance of
corruption by exposing large contributions to the light of publicity").
26. See, e.g., FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 189 (2003) (invoking the appearance of corruption
rationale to uphold a federal prohibition upon direct contributions to nonprofit advocacy organizations);
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388-96 (2000) (citing the appearance of corruption that
justifies a state contribution limit); Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-59
(1990) (reciting the appearance of corruption justification for a state ban on certain corporate campaign
spending).
27. 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003).
28. Id. at 660.
29. Id. at 660-61 (opinion of Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., for the Court) (quoting Shrink Missouri, 528
U.S. at 390).
30. Id. at 748-49 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
31. See HASEN, supra note 1, at 166 (noting without elaboration the appearance of corruption
justification for campaign finance regulations); Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The
New Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 152 U. PA. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2004).
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upon the equality argument for campaign finance regulation, a theory that he-joining
other scholars-has previously advanced with characteristic force. 32 But, as Hasen
admits, the Court stuck to the actual or apparent corruption justification in McConnell
rather than adopting an equality approach. 33 Indeed, Hasen worries that the McConnell
Court "has left open the 'appearance of corruption' as a catch-all for upholding any
campaign finance regulation that fails to meet the test for actual
corruption whenever
34
officeholders."
to
benefits
potential
to
point
can
government
the
Appearances also play a leading role in the Court's so-called reverse racial vote
dilution cases. Justice O'Connor wrote in Shaw v. Reno 35 that "reapportionment is one
area in which appearances matter."' 36 Shaw involved a North Carolina congressional
district that snaked along the 1-85 corridor in a shape that was variously described as
"bizarre" and "irregular." That shape provided prima facie evidence of the legislature's
unconstitutional emphasis upon race in crafting the district. Subsequent cases have
clarified that appearance alone does not render a district unconstitutional, but those
cases have also confirmed the heightened scrutiny received by districts whose unusual
appearance catches the Court's eyes.
Appearances mattered in Bush v. Gore, too. The sight of Florida's butterfly ballots,
hanging chads, and the suddenly famous members of local canvassing boards produced
a visceral reaction to the election throughout the nation. But the nearly evenly divided
nation saw two different versions of events.
They saw:
voters who were
understandably confused versus simply incompetent; marks on ballots that reflected
votes versus mistakes; counting votes versus manufacturing votes; Vice President
Gore's selection of counties where the problems were greatest versus where Gore had
the best chance of winning; the members of canvassing boards and state judges who
were upholding the law versus making it up as they went along; and finally a United
States Supreme Court that saved the nation versus a Supreme Court that stole the
election. Such perceptions shaped the popular reaction to the events in Florida as they
unfolded. The Court did not explicitly condemn the appearances in that case. But the
appearance of what the Florida Supreme Court had done-seemingly dictating the
outcome of the election based upon a problematic understanding of state law-appears
to have influenced the Court's visceral reaction to the case. Indeed, that appearance
might offer a better explanation of the Court's decision than its reasoning, for that
reasoning has been less than convincing to most legal academics.
The Court, in Laurence Tribe's evocative phrase, responded to "the irresistible
allure of appearances" in Bush v. Gore.37 According to Tribe, "Bush v. Gore lays great

32. See Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Couponsfor Democracy: An Egalitarian/PublicChoice Defense of
CampaignFinance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1996); Richard L. Hasen, Campaign FinanceLaws and the
Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1627 (1999).
33. Hasen, Buckley is Dead, supra note 31, at *2 (concluding that "the Court has continued to entertain
the fiction that it is adhering to the anti-corruption rationale of Buckley v. Valeo, perhaps because one or two
members of the five-Justice majority making the shift in McConnell may be unwilling (at least for now) to
expressly embrace Justice Breyer's participatory self-government rationale").
34. Hasen, supra note 31, at 28.
35. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
36. Id. at 647.
37. Laurence H. Tribe, Erog v. Hsub and Its Disguises: FreeingBush v. Gore From Its Hall of Mirrors,
115 HARV. L. REv. 170, 247 (2001).
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emphasis on appearances-both of individual ballots and of the vote-counting process
as a whole." 38 But Tribe chastised the Court for considering "appearances at the most
abstract level of equality imaginable: 'to sustain the confidence that all citizens must
have in the outcome of elections."' 39 And Tribe concludes that "[w]hen the Court
permits appearance to become the dominant value even though what is at 4stake
is not
0
just the appearance of justice, but its very essence, it leaves justice undone."
III.
These three lines of election law cases-involving campaign finance regulation,
reapportionment, and vote counting-share a common but odd preoccupation with
appearances. To be sure, the law turns upon appearances in other areas as well,
including the coercion theory of the establishment clause mentioned by Professor Tribe
and numerous property doctrines and environmental statutes that address aesthetics.
But the appearances play an especially critical role in the Court's understanding of the
applicable legal principles in election law cases.
First, and most importantly, the references to appearances seem to operate as a
proxy for an inability, or an unwillingness, to identify the precise concern raised in each
case. Each area has confronted difficult questions about the harm to be redressed by the
law. What is the harm resulting from campaign spending? Actual corruption is
difficult to prove, and equality remains a controversial goal. The Court has thus
invoked the appearance of corruption as the operative concern for much campaign
finance legislation. The difficulty in specifying the harm vindicated by the reverse race
dilution claim recognized in Shaw is legendary, with the "expressive harm" theory
advanced by Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi most popular.4 1 After Bush v. Gore,
Professor Tribe chastised the Court for trying "to protect some overarching appearance
of partisan neutrality and a decorum that by its very name flourishes in shadow and is
upset by daylight." 42 Election law appears to address a diverse collection of harms, but
it struggles to explain precisely what they are. At the least, the harms are all contested,
which would trigger Professor Hasen's suggestion that the Court tread lightly by
establishing more ambiguous constitutional rules that allow the various theories to
compete for followers.
That suggestion is complicated, though, by the contrasting purposes for which the
Court considers appearances. In three lines of election law cases, the Court judges
governmental actions unconstitutional because of their troubling appearance. The
reapportionment revolution begun by Baker v. Carr holds electoral districts
unconstitutional when they fail to satisfy the one person, one vote principle. Those
cases exist in part because of the unbalanced appearance of districts containing a widely
38. Id. at 251.
39. Id. at 253 (quoting Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109).
40. Id.
41. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting
Rights: EvaluatingElection-DistrictAppearancesAfter Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 483 (1993).
42. Tribe, supra note 37, at 253. See also id. at 252 (asking "What, then was the matter? No proponent
of the Court's equal protection theory has, of yet, articulated how any appearance of inequality, irregularity,
or instability projected by those intrepid ballot readers caused anyone to feel marginalized, diminished, or
otherwise reduced to less than full membership and participation in the polity").
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uneven numbers of voters. But the appearance in those cases was easily judged by the
reality, as confirmed by the simple exercise of counting the number of voters in each
district. The ease of that determination may have seduced the Court into expecting that
other appearances would be similarly judged. Subsequent cases posed more difficult
problems. Yet the Court has emphasized the important role of appearances in
invalidating districts created for a predominant racial motive, and if Professor Tribe is
correct, any allure of appearances quickly confronted angry objections from those who
perceived the 2000 presidential election quite differently. Meanwhile, appearances play
an altogether different role in Buckley and its campaign finance progeny. A troubling
appearance serves to save a governmental actions regulating campaign finance from
unconstitutionality, rather than dooming them.
The diverse roles of appearances and the harms such appearances appear to signify
counsel caution in developing a unified theory of election law. The equal protection of
the laws demands that like things be treated alike; the negative corollary is that similar
treatment is not necessary for things that are not alike. The question thus becomes
whether campaign finance, reapportionment, vote counting, and reverse racial vote
dilution are sufficiently alike to justify the similar treatment that Professor Hasen
prescribes. That question becomes even more complicated once other kinds of election
law issues are added to the mix, including the role of Congress in judging the election
of its members and the criteria by which state courts decide whether to declare the
winner of an election or to order a new election instead.
A unified theory of election law may also encourage the viewing of all legal issues
related to elections through the lens of the viewer's particular normative aspiration of
elections. Election law, for example, may see campaign finance reform as essential to
that aspiration, and thus regard the first amendment as an inconvenient obstacle. The
"first amendment hawks" described by Professor Hasen, approach campaign finance
reform from the perspective of the need to protect free speech in a host of contexts,
rather than simply the funding of speech for electoral matters. They see campaign
finance regulation as more akin to the legal regulation of violent entertainment or
pomography, both of which face First Amendment obstacles despite the serious societal
concerns that they present. In other words, one approach treats campaign finance as a
subset of broader questions about elections, while the other approach treats campaign
finance as a subset of broader questions about the freedom of speech. Likewise, equal
protection jurisprudence encompasses much more than questions of reapportionment,
reverse racial vote dilution, and the permissible procedures for recounting votes. The
importance of perspective is hardly unique to election law---consider the contrasting
perspectives of federal environmental regulation to environmental law and to
constitutional law-but the struggle to identify the proper scope of election law may be
related to this phenomenon.
IV.
Professor Hasen limits his theory to those election law cases involving equality
claims, yet he freely acknowledges his failure to define "equality." Not to worry-the
Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence struggles with that question in areas far
unrelated to election law. And the Court's first amendment jurisprudence fails to align

44
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with any of the multiple theories of free speech. Indeed, most efforts to define the
abstract principle animating particular constitutional commands are frustrated by the
inability or the unwillingness to apply that principle consistently. My modest
suggestion here is that election law might be best served by accepting the possibility
that equal protection, freedom of speech, and other relevant constitutional commands
may yield an election law jurisprudence that cannot be explained by process,
substantive equality, or any other single principle. Instead, the laws governing elections
may reflect a patchwork of insights, just like the laws enacted by those who are elected.

